Some Facts about Polygyny
• 28 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with more than 10% married men in polygynous union. Range: 10.2%-55.6%. Average: 24%.
• Average number of wives per married man > 1, as high as 1.7.
• Almost all men get married: 95%+, average: 97.3%.
• Possible because of high age gap and growing population size. Example: 10 year age gap, annual population growth 3% ⇒ makes average of 1.34 wives per man possible. 
Subscripts: y, o specify age of a man "Child Production"
• Only young adult women are fecund.
• Men can have children in both adult periods, if they have a fecund wife.
• Husband and wife share cost of child-rearing equally.
• If a woman has f children, the total cost is 2ǫf 2 during the period in which she gives birth.
• Suppose an age i man has f i children and n i fecund wives
Marriage
• Competitive market for brides (= young adult women)
• Brideprice: p • Young and old men buy wives
• Fathers sell daughters
Brideprices • There is a cost, a, per daughter who remains unmarried after the father's death, to capture the following:
-Unmarried daughters cannot bear grand-children -Cost of protecting her virginity -She would be without protector after father dies and therefore not have access to land and property
• This assures that fathers are willing to marry their daughters even if p < 0.
• Note: a utility cost leads to similar results.
Woman's Problem • Women obey their husband's fertility decisions.
• Problem of a married woman whose husband wantsf children:
Let M t be # young adult men at time t. 
Fertility and Savings
• Effective marginal cost of an extra child low under polygyny because p > 0 acts like child-rearing subsidy.
• Savings low under polygyny: Brides are an alternative asset. → crowds out investment in physical capital.
Proposition 2 (Monogamy):
1. If there is a BGP with positive population growth in which all women marry, then there is no spousal age gap (f y > 0, n y = 1, f o = n o = 0) and p ≥ −a.
2. If there is a BGP with positive population growth in which some women remain unmarried, then there is a spousal age gap (f o > 0, n o = 1, f y = n y = 0), the fraction of unmarried women is η−1 η , and p = −a. Alternative Policy?
Calibrating the Polygynous Economy
• So far: Banning polygyny increases GDP.
• Monogamy is hard to enforce (many countries have tried)
• Alternative policy?
• Extension: More Rights for Women/Daughters → Analyze a model where daughters choose their own husband.
• Main finding: GDP p.c. ↑, but less. -increase GDP p.c. by 170%
Measure of Women's Rights
• These numbers seem reasonable, given the empirical differences between polygynous and monogamous countries.
• More Rights for Women might also help development.
• Open question: Why do some countries ban polygyny and others don't? 
